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Abstract 
This paper conducts an enquiry into whether various regulatory theories suggest that there exists a 
legitimate rationale for regulating Uber in a New Zealand context. Uber is a company which provides 
an Internet-based mobile phone application that connects passengers and drivers. Uber presents 
regulators with many challenges, some of which this paper focuses on selectively. This paper outlines 
in brief Uber as a company and the service that it provides. It then describes the somewhat unique New 
Zealand taxi industry and associated regulations, and also the regulation pertaining to private hire 
vehicles. The conclusion of this discussion is that Uber is effectively a competitor in the taxi industry, 
even though it is regulated as a private hire service. 
 
The overarching enquiry of this paper whether there is regulatory avoidance, or instead under- or 
over- inclusive rules. A discussion of regulatory compliance theory provides a basis on which to assess 
whether Uber is legitimately or illegitimately avoiding existing regulation, or whether the existing 
rules are failing to meet their intended purpose(s). This issue is discussed throughout the paper in 
relation to the following sections. 
 
Regulatory theories relating to innovation, the sharing economy and welfare economics provide 
different perspectives as to whether regulatory intervention would be justified, particularly when 
focussing on the purposes of regulating. Then, a comparative discussion of Uber in England and 
California highlights how other jurisdictions are approaching Uber in various contexts. This sheds 
light on how other regulators perceive the challenges that Uber presents, and the rationales for 
imposing regulation on different areas of Uber’s operations. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, non-substantive footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14, 901 words. 
 
 
Subjects and Topics 
Uber 
Taxis− taxi driver regulation 
Regulation− regulatory avoidance− regulatory compliance 
Regulation− public interest− welfare economics− information asymmetry 
Innovation− disruptive innovation 
Sharing economy 
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I Introduction 
 
The Internet has changed the way that people are able to act and interact in many 
different markets.1 The Internet has also driven the development of technology-based 
platforms that enhance this lifestyle, including companies such as Uber. Uber has 
become a globally recognisable brand, in large part due to the regulatory battles it has 
faced and continues to face when entering new markets. This paper will explore 
whether there are sound rationales for regulating Uber in a New Zealand context. 
 
Uber presents regulators with multiple challenges relating to vastly different areas of 
law. To that end, this paper will discuss only selected regulatory issues, with a view 
of analysing which of these theories and circumstances provide more persuasive 
arguments that regulatory intervention and imposition is justified. 
 
Section II will provide a brief introduction to Uber as a company and to its operations. 
Section III outlines the overarching consideration of this paper; the extent to which 
Uber is avoiding existing regulations, legitimately or illegitimately. A parallel 
question is whether those rules are over- or under-inclusive in their scope relative to 
their purpose. These two questions underpin the enquiry of whether legitimate 
rationales for regulation exist, and frame the analysis of the following sections. 
 
Section IV contains a short description of the New Zealand taxi industry, the existing 
regulatory requirements regarding licensing of both taxi drivers and private hire 
drivers, and the influence of Uber’s arrival on the taxi market. This discussion 
demonstrates how current frameworks have created a cloudy regulatory environment 
for Uber’s operations. The New Zealand taxi industry is somewhat exceptional in that 
it is not limited by price and quantity restrictions. Thus, the focus of existing 
regulations is that of quality and passenger safety, which arguably can equally apply 
to both taxis and Uber.  
 
                                                 
1  Rachel Botsman “The Sharing Economy Lacks A Shared Definition” (21 November 2013) 
Fast Company <www.fastcoexist.com>. 
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Section V will consider to what extent innovation may influence rationales for 
regulating Uber. In theory, innovation can create legitimate reasons to avoid existing 
and perhaps outdated regulations. ‘Sharing’ economies uses innovative technologies 
to share underutilised resources, and allow people to consume goods and services in a 
more economically efficient manner. Disruptive innovations may create a situation 
where the existing regulatory framework does not effectively deal with the new 
technology, leading to regulatory failure. Both of these concepts challenge regulators 
to determine how these new businesses should fit within a regulatory regime.  
 
A welfare economics rationale for regulation is one of multiple perspectives to assess 
when regulatory intervention is justifiable. Section VI applies this traditional theory to 
Uber in order to determine whether Uber is creating or exacerbating ‘traditional’ 
market failures, and if, so, justifies the further imposition of rules restricting its 
activities. In relation to market power and information asymmetry problems in the 
taxi industry, it can be shown that Uber is in fact reducing these problems, and thus 
should not be subject to regulation related to correcting these market failures. 
 
Section VII will provide comparative examples to Uber’s experiences in New 
Zealand. Many countries and cities are experiencing regulatory challenges regarding 
Uber, relating to various aspects of its business model. England’s experience provides 
a useful comparison of the rationales for distinguishing taxi and private hire services. 
Elsewhere, Uber’s ongoing dispute in Californian under employment law provides a 
potential glimpse into a future regulatory issue which New Zealand regulators may 
have to face. These examples also indicate how overseas regulators perceive the 
dynamic between regulatory avoidance and failures in framing the applicable rules. 
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II Uber 
 
Uber is a San Francisco-based company that operates a ride-share mobile phone 
application (“app”). The company was founded in 2009 and is expanding rapidly 
worldwide.2 As at 28 September 2015, the Uber service is available in 60 countries.3 
 
The app connects people needing a car ride from point A to point B with a driver and 
a car. Customers set their pickup and drop off locations and request a ride, which can 
then be accepted by a driver. The driver’s details are sent to the customer, who can 
choose to accept or reject the driver’s offer. Upon acceptance, the customer is shown 
the route and their estimated time of arrival.4 Customers can also access a fare quote 
once they have entered their destination.5 
 
Customers pre-enter their payment details, so no money physically changes hands 
after the ride is complete; rather, the fare is automatically deducted from the 
customer’s registered credit card. Uber takes a percentage of the fare for itself, and 
part of the fare is transferred to the driver as payment.6 After the ride is complete, 
both driver and passenger must rate each other out of five stars. The rating is recorded 
and aggregated, and actively checked for consistently poor feedback. If this occurs, 
the low-ranking passenger or driver is removed from the Uber community.7 
 
Some aspects of the Uber platform have caused public controversy and significant 
media attention. For example, Uber classes their drivers as independent contractors, 
rather than employees.8 This creates issues regarding liability, particularly in cases 
                                                 
2  “The Company” Uber <www.uber.com>. 
3  “Cities” Uber <www.uber.com>. 
4    An estimated time of arrival is only available on the iOS app for Apple products. 
5  “How To Uber” Uber <www.uber.com>. 
6  John Patrick Pullen “Everything You Need To Know About Uber” (4 November 2014) TIME 
<http://time.com>. 
7  Steffen Rusten “Uber in New Zealand” (19 January 2015) Uber 
<http://blog.uber.com/uberinnz>. 
8  Rusten, above n 7. 
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where Uber drivers have caused personal injury or death.9 Further, this categorisation 
has been challenged, occasionally successfully, at lower levels of the judicial 
hierarchy.10 Uber’s use of surge pricing− where the price of a journey may fluctuate 
according to demand− has also upset some users, but Uber’s CEO Travis Kalanick 
has defended the mechanism, saying it is “classic Econ 101”.11 These examples 
provide only a taste of the regulatory hurdles Uber is currently facing. 
 
Uber is often characterised as a “brash and, so far, highly effective” competitor to 
incumbent taxi industries.12 This relationship has caused significant backlash from 
taxi drivers in many cities. Uber does not consider itself to be a taxi company, and 
therefore believes that taxi regulations do not apply to it. The typical Uber approach 
to entering a new market is to launch the app in a new city regardless of the existing 
legal framework. In the face of seemingly inevitable regulatory challenge, Uber 
unleashes lobbyists and its swarm of newly loyal users to lobby governments and 
regulators.13 
 
Uber’s categorisation of its business model is potentially masking the true nature of 
the Uber service. While Uber has demonstrated that it has powerful voice when 
expressing its defiance towards existing regulations, the question of whether this is 
legitimate, in light of both the scope and purpose of the regulations, should be 
considered.14 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  “Ex-Uber Driver Charged With Manslaughter in Death of 6-Year-Old” (9 December 2014) 
TIME <http://time.com>. 
10  See, for example, the comparative discussion of California in the comparative section of this 
paper. 
11  Kara Swisher “Man and Uber Man” (December 2014) Vanity Fair <www.vanityfair.com>. 
12  Rosalind S Helderman “Uber pressures regulators by mobilizing riders and hiring vast 
lobbying network” (13 December 2014) The Washington Post <www.washingtonpost.com>. 
13  Helderman, above n 12. 
14  For example, Uber lobbied heavily, and successfully, in New York City when a temporary cap 
on growth was proposed: see Tim Fernholz “The latest round in Uber’s battle for New York 
City, explained” (30 June 2015) QZ <http://qz.com/441608/the-latest-round-in-ubers-battle-
for-new-york-city-explained/>. 
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III Regulatory Avoidance 
 
Uber is often described as operating in a legal grey area, and consequently various 
regulatory authorities have responded in a multitude of ways.15 Some regulators have 
imposed pre-existing rules which currently apply to analogous markets, even though 
Uber may not create the problems that the regulations are aimed at minimising.16 
Elsewhere, some jurisdictions have banned Uber outright, while others have been 
relatively sluggish or non-committal in their response. The wide variety of reactions 
suggests that there are radically different views about how Uber should be regulated. 
 
Uber supports “sensible, safety-based regulations and ones that are in the consumer 
interest”.17 The company states that it aims to work with officials to change existing 
laws that it argues do not apply to the service.18 CEO Travis Kalanick is extremely 
vocal in his dislike of outdated regulations. For example, he has stated that:19 
 
… when we [Uber] show up in a new city, we don’t ask for special favours or 
handouts. When we are asked to abide by modern regulations that protect the 
rights and safety drivers and passengers, we do– because we believe in those 
protections too. 
 
The divergence of views about whether Uber should be subject to regulation, and, if 
so, how, suggests that the focus of the inquiry should be the underlying purposes of 
the regulations. This focus will help to determine the rules’ applicability and 
relevance to Uber, and whether Uber’s strenuous pushback is warranted. 
 
                                                 
15  Janelle Orsi “The Sharing Economy Just Got Real” (16 September 2013) Shareable 
<www.shareable.net>. 
16  Christopher Koopman and others “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection 
Regulation: The Case for Policy Change” (Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University, December 2014) at 5. 
17  Rusten, above n 7. 
18  Helderman, above n 12. 
19  Travis Kalanick “5-Year Anniversary Remarks from Uber CEO Travis Kalanick” (speech to 
employees, driver partners and special guests, San Francisco, 3 June 2015).  
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A corresponding question is whether Uber is engaging in regulatory avoidance, and if 
so, whether this is legitimate or illegitimate. Illegitimate regulatory avoidance can be 
described as a situation where Uber provides a service that, in substance, is caught by 
the purpose or goal of the relevant regulation. However, Uber claims that the 
regulation does not apply, based on some legal construct that masks the fact that, in 
essence, the same activity or service is being provided. On the other hand, Uber will 
be legitimately avoiding regulation if they are providing something substantively 
different to the activity which is intended to be regulated, or if the regulation simply 
does not catch the activity. Phrased another way, if the goal of the regulation does not 
apply to Uber’s activities, there is no legitimate reason for the regulation to extend to 
Uber. 
 
A Theories of Non-Compliance and Why Rules Fail 
Regulatory avoidance is a form of non-compliance. Karen Yeung suggests that it is 
possible to draw a distinction between ‘rule compliance’ and ‘substantive 
compliance’.20 If an actor is engaging in mere ‘rule compliance’ they are complying 
with the letter of the law, but at the same time they are also deliberately avoiding the 
substance of the rule; that is, its purpose and intention. This misfit of rule and 
behaviour may be attributable either to flaws in the rule, or to the behaviour of the 
actor. Both of these perspectives are potentially relevant to many of the situations 
which Uber finds itself in. 
 
1 Over- or under- inclusive rules 
Julia Black states that rules may fail to capture their intended substance for three main 
reasons: relevantly for this discussion, for the rule’s over- or under-inclusiveness, or 
its indeterminacy.21 First, rules are either over- or under-inclusive because they are 
based on imperfect generalisations. Generalisations can suppress relevant information 
or elevate unimportant information, or represent only an approximate relationship 
between the generalisation and the goal or purpose of the regulation. They may also 
                                                 
20  Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) at 152. 
21  Julia Black ‘Rules and Regulators’ in Morgan and Yeung, above n 20, at 153. 
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fail to cover future developments.22 Black suggests that a flaw in a rule will be 
exacerbated in certain circumstances, such as:23 
 
… where the context in which the rule operates is one which is subject to 
frequent change, where the course of change is unforeseeable, where the 
range of situations in which the rule will apply is great, and where there is an 
uncertain causal relationship between the events, objects or behaviour 
focused on and the harm to be avoided or the goal to be achieved. 
 
Applying this theory to Uber, it may appear that a variety of existing rules are under-
inclusive from the perspectives of, for example, Uber’s competitors or the relevant 
regulatory agency. These actors would argue that Uber should be subject to certain 
rules, even if they currently do not apply. Conversely, Uber may claim that in some 
situations the law is over-inclusive and inappropriately extends to them, because the 
goals of the regulation do not apply to Uber’s activity that is caught within the 
regulation. 
 
Uber could be described as introducing an ‘unforeseeable course of change’ into the 
market, and also as creating uncertainty between Uber’s behaviour and activities and 
the existing regulatory goals. Thus, Black’s criteria indicate that Uber perhaps 
presents a situation in which the problems created by an over- or under-inclusive rule 
will be exacerbated. The question of a rule’s under- or over-inclusiveness will be 
discussed throughout this paper, where relevant, in the context of different regulatory 
areas and theories. 
 
2 Indeterminacy and interpretive failure 
Secondly, a rule’s failure can sometimes stem from the rule’s inability to anticipate all 
future events and possibilities.24 It is almost impossible for the law to foresee all 
developments that it may be expected to cover, and therefore when new situations 
                                                 
22  At 153-154. 
23  At 154. 
24  At 155. 
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arise it is unclear how the rule may apply.25 Black suggests a remedy to interpretative 
failures of law is the use of “vague, permissive language” to mitigate opportunities to 
interpret law formalistically.26 A formalistic approach to law– one that reveres form 
over substance– allows creative compliance to flourish.27 There is potential for a 
regulated actor to engage in create compliance, which constitutes illegitimate 
regulatory avoidance. 
 
3 Creative compliance 
In taking a formalistic approach to the law, actors can comply literally with the black-
letter rule (‘rule compliance’ as termed by Yeung), while failing to substantively 
comply with the underlying purpose of the same rule. 28  As a result, an actor can 
engage in creative compliance by exploiting formalism in order to avoid legal control, 
rather to comply with the law.29 Creative compliance allows actors to manipulate and 
undermine the purpose of regulation. Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan 
emphasise this by noting that “[u]nless the rules promote the overall purpose of the 
law, compliance with them and insisting on their literal interpretation or enforcement 
will not achieve the declared objectives.”30  
 
Situations where it is open to argument that Uber is engaging in a form of creative 
compliance will be addressed throughout the paper. The line between creative 
compliance and situations where a rule is under-inclusive is often difficult to 
demarcate. In the former situation, the regulated actor is deliberately constructing 
their compliance in a way that undermines the rule. In the latter, the fault lies with the 
rule-maker and the unfit-for-purpose rule. Consequently, the ‘fault’ or regulatory 
failure may lie with either the regulatory agency, or with Uber, or it may be difficult 
to state for sure which is responsible for the failure. 
 
                                                 
25  Doreen McBarnet “Law, Policy, and Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively Implement 
Egalitarian Policies?” (1988) 15(1) Journal of Law and Society 113 at 120. 
26  Morgan and Yeung, above n 20, at 158. 
27  Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan “The elusive spirit of the law: Formalism and the 
struggle for legal control” (1991) 54(6) Mod L Rev 848 at 849. 
28  At 850. 
29  At 849. 
30  At 850. 
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The topic of regulatory avoidance, and particularly creative compliance, is more 
common in some areas of literature, such as taxation and accounting.31 It has been 
claimed that Uber is avoiding tax in many of the jurisdictions where it is operating, 
but this paper will not be dealing with taxation issues.32 
 
B A Framework for the Paper 
The considerations of regulatory compliance or avoidance will be addressed 
throughout this paper. The approach will be as follows. First, the initial enquiry is to 
determine the purpose or goal of the regulation in question. Secondly, is Uber caught 
by the regulation? If so, is this due to the rule being over-inclusive? A related 
question is whether Uber is engaging in illegitimate avoidance, possibly by creatively 
complying with the existing regulation. 
 
Thirdly, if the regulation does not capture Uber’s activity, the relevant inquiry is 
whether the purposes or goals of the existing regulation apply to Uber’s activities. Is 
Uber’s activity substantially different to that which the law intends to regulate? 
Would imposing regulation on Uber be pursuing the same goal? If answered in the 
affirmative, it is implied Uber is legitimately avoiding regulation, since the rules are 
technically failing to catch them. However, in such a situation the spirit and purpose 
of the law is being undermined. Thus suggests the law is under-inclusive relative to its 
purpose. Additionally, Uber will be engaging in legitimate avoidance if their activity 
is genuinely something new and different that the existing law is not intended to 
regulate. 
 
This approach will permeate the following discussions of the New Zealand taxi 
industry and Uber’s role within it, Uber’s position within the sharing economy, the 
role of innovation in Uber’s business model, a welfare economics rationale for 
regulation, and an analysis of Uber within different jurisdictions. In each of these 
sections, a discussion of the purposes of regulation, whether Uber is captured within 
                                                 
31  See, for example, McBarnet and Whelan, above n 27. 
32  See, for example, Winston Peters “An Uber Rip Off For Taxpayers” (21 January 2015) New 
Zealand First <http://nzfirst.org.nz>.  
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the regulation or its purpose, and any regulatory avoidance issues will attempt to 
inform under what circumstances there is a sound rationale for regulating Uber. 
 
 
IV Taxis and Uber in New Zealand 
 
A Deregulation in the Taxi Industry 
The New Zealand taxi industry was historically subject to price and quantity controls, 
which were removed in 1989. The regulation of prices and quantities of taxis was 
replaced with new regulations relating to taxi drivers.33 The larger players in the 
industry drove out smaller businesses, and by 2008 the New Zealand Taxi Federation 
owned around half of the taxi fleet in New Zealand.34 There are approximately 7,000 
taxis currently operating in New Zealand, compared to 2,700 during the regulated 
era.35 However, passenger numbers have not significantly risen since deregulation 
occurred.36  
 
The increase in the number of vehicles available for hire has not driven down the 
price of taxis, as would normally be predicted when a market is flooded with 
suppliers. In a 2014 study, Christchurch and Queenstown were found to be the most 
expensive and second most expensive cities in the world respectively to hire a taxi 
from the city centre to the airport, on a dollar per kilometre basis. In the same study, 
New Zealand was also the most expensive country in the world to commute from the 
airport to the city centre.37 Thus, it appears that without price regulation the market 
has a tendency to offer relatively high prices and high levels of supply.  From an 
economic perspective this is unusual, and may indicate an atypical market structure; 
in particular an unusual supply curve structure. A full explanation of this unfamiliar 
market structure goes beyond the scope of this paper, but would make for interesting 
further research. 
                                                 
33  Jane Tolerton “Taxis and cabs - Taxi industry deregulation”, Te Ara <www.TeAra.govt.nz>. 
34  “About Us” New Zealand Taxi Federation <www.taxifed.co.nz>. “About Us”, above n 34. 
35  “About Us”, above n 34. 
36  Tolerton, above n 33. 
37  GO Rentals “Taxi Charges to the World’s Most Visited Cities (June 2014) GO Rentals 
<www.gorentals.co.nz>. 
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New Zealand’s taxi industry deregulation is often held up as the “holy grail” of 
reform, but many voices now support the idea of reregulation to limit taxi numbers 
within certain areas, and also limiting fares.38 Deregulation has certainly increased 
customer choice, but has not correspondingly resulted in a decrease in price. Despite 
the general understanding that a deregulated market will move to an equilibrium 
determined by supply and demand, the equilibrium in the New Zealand taxi market 
has been criticised as being too high.39 
 
This may be partially explained by the way in which taxis are required to set their 
fares. Taxi organisations must have their fares approved by the New Zealand 
Transport Agency (“NZTA”) before displaying them in or on a taxi.40 These fares 
cannot be altered on a case-by-case basis, as any alteration must be processed through 
the NZTA.41 This may discourage taxi organisations from constantly altering their 
fares, which removes the ability for the prices of taxis to be responsive to consumer 
demand. Further, there is industry consensus that the fares are set in an attempt to 
ensure that taxi drivers can earn a living in what is becoming an unforgiving 
industry.42 This suggests that fares are being set at an artificially high rate, which is 
preventing the market from moving to a naturally determined equilibrium. 
 
B The Taxi Regulatory Framework 
The removal of quantity and price restrictions in the taxi industry led to new standards 
being imposed on taxi drivers. The intention of this shift was to transition from a 
quantity to a quality standard.43 Taxis are regulated under the small passenger 
services regulatory framework. The Land Transport Rule: Operator Licensing 2007 
defines a small passenger service vehicle as a passenger service vehicle that seats 
                                                 
38  Geoff Cumming “Taxis− why you’re paying so much” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
New Zealand, 17 May 2014). 
39  Peter Mills “Taxi fares: Feeling ripped off? Find out what your taxi should cost” The New 
Zealand Herald (online ed, New Zealand, 6 April 2015). 
40  Land Transport Rule: Operator Licensing 2007, cl 4.9(1). 
41  Land Transport Rule: Operator Licensing 2007, cl 4.10. 
42  Cumming, above n 38. 
43  Effectiveness of controls over the taxi industry: Report of the Controller and Auditor-General 
(Controller and Auditor-General, Report, June 2005) at 28. 
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twelve people or fewer, including the driver.44 Thus, small passenger services extends 
beyond taxis, and includes vehicles such as minivans and hired wedding cars. 
 
Taxi drivers, or their employer, must hold a passenger service licence in order to carry 
passengers.45 Additionally, taxi drivers are required to hold a P endorsement, which 
allows them to carry passengers. Requisites of the application for a P endorsement 
include the completion of a theory course, and holding a full New Zealand class one 
driver licence for at least two years.46 If drivers are intending to operate in certain 
areas, they must also obtain an area knowledge certificate.47 The NZTA will also 
undertake a background check to ensure that the applicant is a fit and proper person.48 
 
Part 4A Subpart 2 of the Land Transport Act 1998 outlines factors the NZTA will 
take into account when making a fit and proper person assessment. It includes a police 
check, which may canvas such matters as a person’s criminal history, any historical 
transport-related offences, and any complaints made about the person in respect of 
those offences, particularly from users.49 For drivers of small passenger service 
vehicles such as taxis, the NZTA will pay particular attention to any history of serious 
behavioural problems, violent, sexual or drug-related offending, transport-related 
offences, and any persistent or serious complaints, especially in respect of the person 
or transport service.50 Persons convicted of specified serious offences are prohibited 
from holding a P endorsement.51 It is evident that a fit and proper person assessment 
is intended to ensure that persons holding a P endorsement are trustworthy, thereby 
ensuring the quality of people who hold those endorsements. 
 
When providing taxi services, drivers must adhere to rules about the length of time 
they are permitted to work for at any one time. Section 30ZC imposes limits on work 
                                                 
44  Land Transport Rule: Operator Licensing 2007, Part 2. 
45  Report of the Controller and Auditor-General, above n 43, at 31-32. 
46  “P endorsement for carrying passengers” New Zealand Transport Agency 
<www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
47  See “Taxi drivers and area knowledge certificates” New Zealand Transport Agency 
<www.nzta.govt.nz> for a list of areas requiring area knowledge certificates. 
48  “Fit and proper person check” New Zealand Transport Agency <www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
49  Land Transport Act 1998, s 30C. 
50  Section 30D. 
51  Section 29A. 
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time; under subs (2)(a) a driver may not exceed 13 hours of work in any cumulative 
work day. Correspondingly, under subs (2)(b) a driver must have at least 10 hours of 
continuous rest time. Section (3) states that drivers may not work more than 70 hours 
in one week. Section 30ZD outlines which records taxi drivers must keep. They 
include time records, wage records, and other employment related records for the 
driver. These regulations are intended to ensure that taxi drivers are competent while 
they are on the road, and are again related to upholding the quality of taxi drivers in 
general. 
 
In addition to these obligations, taxi drivers must display prices outside and inside 
their taxi, and their photo identification must also be visible.52 The requirement of 
displaying prices is intended to ensure that consumers are informed about the relevant 
costs, which becomes important when canvassing the distinction between taxis and 
other forms of small passenger service vehicles. 
 
It is evident that these requirements are relatively burdensome, which is 
understandable, given that the purpose of the regulation is to ensure the high quality 
of people employed as taxi drivers. Thus, while the New Zealand taxi industry is 
commonly referred to as a ‘deregulated’ industry, this may be a misnomer, or at the 
very least misleading. While there are no longer any price or quantity controls in the 
market, there are other significant regulatory requirements aimed at upholding the 
quality of taxi drivers which have an effect the operation of the market. 
 
C Uber in New Zealand 
Uber currently operates in Auckland and Wellington, and has begun recruiting drivers 
in Christchurch.53 In September 2015 Uber marked its one-millionth ride provided in 
New Zealand after just over one year of operation.54 Uber’s growing popularity is 
seemingly buoyed by a general feeling of dissatisfaction with taxi services, and 
                                                 
52  Tolerton, above n 33. 
53  Brittany Mann “More than 1300 apply for Uber jobs in Christchurch” (8 July 2015) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz>. 
54  “Uber NZ marks millionth ride” (24 September 2015) Radio New Zealand 
<www.radionz.co.nz>. 
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particularly with high prices.55 However, Uber’s operations have not been without 
significant media attention, and, predictably, backlash from the taxi industry. This is 
also true of the response to Uber in many other countries. 
 
Like taxis, Uber is classified as a small passenger service, but it is not subject to 
exactly the same regulations. Uber works with drivers that have been vetted and 
approved by the NZTA in order to operate as a private hire service.56 A private hire 
service is defined as a passenger service carried on by means of a private hire 
vehicle.57 A private hire vehicle is one which is operating a small passenger service, 
carrying passengers for reward, and is pre-booked on an agreed fare basis.58 This 
definition excludes taxis, on the basis that taxis do not pre-arrange fares. Other forms 
of transport covered by the private hire services regime include wedding cars and 
limousines.59 
 
Uber drivers must hold a driver licence, a P endorsement licence, and have their own 
vehicle with a current warrant of fitness.60 Uber drivers are not required to have 
additional insurance,61 but they are required to be registered as a private hire vehicle, 
or work for an employer who holds these licences.62 Similarly to taxi drivers, private 
hire drivers must either hold, or be employed by a holder of, a passenger service 
licence, and must also hold and display a current driver identification card.63 
Restrictions on work hours are also imposed on private hire drivers, so as to lower the 
risk of overworked drivers being on the road.64 
 
                                                 
55  See, for example, Cumming, above n 38. 
56  “Required licences” Uber <www.driveuber.co.nz>. 
57  Land Transport Rule: Operator Licensing 2007, Part 2. 
58  Land Transport Rule: Operator Licensing 2007, Part 2. 
59  “Questions and answers on SPSVS” (25 February 2015) Ministry of Transport 
<www.transport.govt.nz>. 
60  “Getting Licensed to Drive with Uber!” Uber <http://blog.uber.com>. 
61  “Getting Licensed to Drive with Uber!” above n 60. 
62  “Types of passenger services” New Zealand Transport Agency <www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
63  “Getting Licensed to Drive with Uber!”, above n 60. 
64  “Work-time and log book requirements” New Zealand Transport Agency 
<www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
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Recently, several Auckland Uber drivers have been fined for using the Uber app as a 
meter. This is prohibited for private hire services, since the fare must be pre-agreed. 
However, there was insufficient evidence to charge the drivers, and the fines were 
reimbursed.65 Uber spokeswoman Katie Curran has stated that there are a number of 
precedents around the world determining that smartphones are not taxi meters.66 
However, this is one of many regulatory issues for which Uber is consistently 
garnering media attention. In large cities with established taxi industries such as 
London, taxis drivers have loudly protested this particular aspect of Uber’s 
technology. 
 
It should also be emphasised that the legal scope of Uber’s model is the facilitation of 
the interaction between driver and rider, rather than the provision of the service itself. 
Roger Heale, executive director of the New Zealand Taxi Federation, points out that 
such a term effectively absolves Uber of responsibility for any of its drivers’ 
conduct.67 Such a characterisation of Uber’s activities has significant implications 
legally in terms of limiting its liabilities. However, when considering the scope of 
Uber’s activities within the market, a more practical approach will be taken, rather 
than a strictly legalistic one. 
 
D Small Passenger Services Review 
Uber is currently awaiting the outcome of the Small Passenger Services Review 
(“SPSR”) before considering any further expansion to its service in New Zealand.68 
The Ministry of Transport is leading the review, with the assistance of the NTZA and 
the New Zealand Police.69 The aim of the SPSR is “to ensure that New Zealand’s 
regulatory environment for [small passenger service vehicles] continues to be fit for 
                                                 
65  John Antony “Police drop charges against 16 Auckland drivers” (8 June 2015) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz>. 
66  Ian Steward “Passengers focus of Uber crack-down” (12 January 2015) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz>.  
67  Roger Heale “Taxis face rigorous safety standards – Uber doesn’t” The Dominion Post (online 
ed, Wellington, 22 September 2015). Uber’s New Zealand user terms were unavailable at the 
time of writing to confirm Mr Heale’s statement. 
68  Shawn McAvinue “Uber offering icecream but that’s all for now” Otago Daily Times (online 
ed, New Zealand, 24 July 2015). 
69  “Small passenger services review” (17 April 2015) Ministry of Transport 
<www.transport.govt.nz>. 
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purpose and flexible enough to accommodate new technologies.”70 Thus, it is clear 
the review will consider the impact of new market players such as Uber. 
 
The SPSR will review the licensing requirements applicable to small passenger 
service vehicle, and intends to provide an updated regulatory framework.71 Uber has 
made an application to the SPSR requesting that the current licensing requirements be 
relaxed, as it feels that “the licensing structure in New Zealand is the single biggest 
barrier to competition and growth in [the] industry”.72 Uber New Zealand spokesman 
Oscar Peppitt states that the existing requirements are “a serious barrier to someone 
using their car to make some money”.73 As yet, there is no indication as to whether 
Uber’s requests will be taken into account in any potential regulatory reform. 
 
The SPSR was expected to be complete by mid 2015, with subsequent advice to be 
presented to the Associate Transport Minister. If the SPSR concludes that changes to 
the regulatory framework for licensing must be made, the review will propose 
amendments to the relevant legislation, which will be debated in a public consultation 
process. If necessary, this will occur later in 2015.74 Transport Minister Simon 
Bridges has hinted that the government will take a light-handed approach to 
regulating Uber, in order to allow the ‘ridesharing technology’ to grow, with the 
intention of benefitting consumers.75 It is expected that the outcome of the review will 
“be closely analysed around the world”, as the framing of the regulations could set a 
standard which other countries are encouraged to follow.76  
 
                                                 
70  “Small passenger services review”, above n 69. 
71  “Small passenger services review”, above n 69. 
72  John Anthony “Uber hotly anticipating result of Government’s transport review” (15 
September 2015) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
73  Jessy Edwards “Uber asks government to relax the rules” (22 May 2015) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz>. 
74  “Small passenger services review”, above n 69. 
75  Michael Forbes “Government says it will ‘take the lightest touch possible’ to regulating Uber” 
(6 June 2015) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
76  Grant Bradley “NZ could set world standard, Uber tells Bridges” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, New Zealand, 1 June 2015). 
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E A Regulatory Avoidance Analysis 
It is apparent that the requirements imposed on private hire drivers are essentially the 
same as those imposed on taxi drivers. Since both must hold a P endorsement and 
either hold, or be employed by someone who holds, a passenger service licence, the 
standard to this extent is identical. The purpose of these regulations, as discussed 
above, is to ensure the quality of drivers and also the safety of both drivers and 
passengers. This goal applies equally to taxi services and Uber, since no real 
distinction should be made between ensuring the quality and safety of a taxi journey 
versus an Uber journey. Therefore, the P endorsement and passenger service licence 
requirements are neither under- nor over-inclusive relative to their purpose. 
 
However, not all regulation for private hire services is exactly the same as for taxis. 
For example, the requirement to install security cameras does not apply to private hire 
services.77 From a safety perspective, this is less than desirable for riders choosing to 
use Uber over taxis. Further, if the intention of the existing regulations is to ensure 
quality and safety, it is unclear why there is a split in the standard for taxi drivers and 
passenger hire services; perhaps it would be desirable to have similar, if not identical 
standards, particularly in relation to Uber. This may suggest that this rule is currently 
under-inclusive relative to its purpose of ensuring the welfare of drivers and 
passengers. There is a clear rationale for extending such a rule, which has the purpose 
of improving both driver and passenger safety, to Uber.  
 
Uber’s request that the licensing requirements be relaxed indicates that they believe 
the existing rules are over-inclusive. This may suggest that that New Zealand has a 
high standard of driver vetting in comparison to other cities where Uber operates. 
However, Uber’s perspective arguably places too much emphasis on the employment 
and income-earning benefits of working for Uber relative to the necessary safety 
goals of regulating transport services. Having an even lower standard for Uber 
drivers, who are providing essentially the same service as taxi drivers, is unlikely to 
be palatable to a safety-conscious public. Thus, arguing that the rule is over-inclusive 
                                                 
77  Under the Land Transport Rule: Operator Licensing 2007, area knowledge tests only apply to 
taxi services (s 4). Further, s 4A only refers to taxis in relation to in-vehicle security camera 
systems. 
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seems facetious when looking at the underlying purposes of the existing licensing 
system. 
 
The requirement that private hire vehicles must arrange an advance fare also 
distinguishes them from taxi services. Charges were dropped against New Zealand 
Uber drivers because there was insufficient evidence to prove any illegal behaviour. 
However, Uber’s app seems to be a prima facie breach of this rule. Uber is perhaps 
engaging in creative compliance by stating that their app is not a meter, and therefore 
complies with the private hire regulations. 
 
In London, the relevant regulator Transport for London reacted to this same complaint 
by stating that there was no breach,78 since the Uber app did not have “some sort of 
connection between the device and the vehicle” which is the case with taxis; instead, 
the app makes use of global positioning time and distance data, which was not 
illegal.79 This seems to be a very fine distinction, but one that seems to satisfy both 
English and New Zealand regulators– so far, at least. Is the purpose behind this rule 
intended to capture activities such as those that Uber provides? This will accordingly 
inform whether the existing rule is under-inclusive in its scope. 
 
A fare that is set in advance provides certainty for customers. Situations such as hiring 
wedding cars and limousines may require budgeting, or at least searching for prices 
before deciding which company to hire with. Customers booking this type of service 
have an increased ability to shop around and compare prices. If certainty is indeed the 
reason behind the rule, it seems that Uber’s activity does not fall within the purpose of 
the regulation. Uber operates much in the same way as taxis, offering ‘everyday’ 
journeys rather than necessarily for special occasions, and therefore the advance 
certainty of a fare is perhaps not such an important consideration. 
 
                                                 
78  Paul Sawers “Taxi regulator TfL takes legal advice and concludes Uber is operating lawfully 
in London” (3 July 2014) The Next Web <http://thenextweb.com/uk>. 
79  Dave Lee and Leo Kelion “London black taxis plan congestion chaos to block Uber” (8 May 
2014) British Broadcasting Company <www.bbc.com>. 
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Further, the requirement that taxi drivers operating in some areas must take 
knowledge area tests seems inapplicable to Uber, as Uber drivers are guided by a 
global positioning system through the Uber app. Requiring Uber drivers to pass an 
area knowledge test would be a redundant requirement, since they can rely on 
immediate GPS information and location services. Therefore, the purpose of such a 
rule– ensuring that drivers know their surroundings and can navigate– does not seem 
to be applicable to Uber drivers. 
 
In summary, the regulations which have the purposes of ensuring safety, but do not 
currently apply to private hire vehicles, should be extended to include Uber, as its 
activities are similar enough to taxis to require the additional safety standards. In 
contrast, the private hire rule requiring a pre-set fare seems inapplicable to Uber in 
practice, as it is very different to other types of private hire services which have a 
greater need for price certainty. The purpose behind the rule regarding area 
knowledge tests is also inapplicable to Uber, since the app is able to meet the goal of 
the rule without the need for regulatory intervention. This particular aspect of Uber’s 
business model is also highly relevant to an enquiry of whether innovation justifies 
regulatory avoidance, which this paper will now turn to. 
 
 
V The Role of Innovation 
 
F The Sharing Economy 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a sharing economy as “an economic system in 
which assets or services are shared between private individuals, either for free or for a 
fee, typically by means of the Internet”.80 An alternate definition is “[a]n economic 
model based on sharing underutilised assets from spaces to skills to stuff for monetary 
or non-monetary benefits.”81 The latter definition is narrower than the former, as it 
focuses on the underutilisation of existing resources. Rather than the market 
                                                 
80  “Sharing economy” Oxford Dictionaries <www.oxforddictionaries.com>. 
81  Botsman “The Sharing Economy Lacks A Shared Definition”, above n 1. 
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facilitating transfer of ownership, lenders retain ownership over their goods, and 
borrowers pay for a right of limited use.82  
 
The sharing economy can be distinguished from other forms of economy due to the 
requirement of a digital platform that facilitates interaction between lenders and 
borrowers.83 Modern technological changes and innovations have created an 
unprecedented ability to tap into the capacity of underutilised resources and 
temporarily redistribute them, in order to increase their efficiency and also to improve 
consumer utility.84 Thus, it is often proposed that the sharing economy is innovative, 
in that it offers innovative solutions to traditional market problems. 
 
In news articles or opinion pieces it is common to see Uber cited as an example of the 
sharing economy. However, there is also strong dissent to the suggestion that Uber 
belongs in this category.85 In order to determine whether Uber does indeed participate 
in a sharing economy, and what relevance this may have for a regulatory analysis, it is 
first useful to examine what is meant by the term. 
 
The phrase ‘sharing economy’ has a vigorously contested scope. Sharing has a 
“positive and progressive connotation”, which incentivises businesses to brand 
themselves as being part of the new trend.86 However, the term is often misapplied to 
relationships that involve no collaboration at all, or to refer to all digital start-ups in 
general.87 Rachel Botsman attributes some of this confusion to ‘Uberification’– where 
companies with similar structures to Uber are instinctively categorised as part of the 
sharing economy. Botsman would instead place Uber in the category of the ‘on-
                                                 
82  Bryant Cannon and Hanna Chung “A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation Models Well-
Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies” (2015) 31(1) Santa Clara High Tech 
L J 23 at 29. 
83  At 29. 
84  Botsman “The Sharing Economy Lacks A Shared Definition”, above n 1. 
85  See, for example, Frank Pasquale and Siva Vaidhyanathan “Uber and the lawlessness of 
‘sharing economy’ corporates” (28 July 2015) The Guardian <www.theguardian.com>, and 
contrast with Toon Meelen and Koen Frenken “Stop Saying Uber Is Part Of The Sharing 
Economy” (14 January 2015) Fast Company <www.fastcoexist.com>. 
86  Meelen and Frenken, above n 85. 
87  Rachel Botsman “Defining The Sharing Economy: What Is Collaborative Consumption – And 
What Isn’t?” (27 May 2015) Fast Company <www.fastcoexist.com>. 
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demand’ economy, which refers to “platforms that directly match customer needs 
with providers to immediately deliver goods and services”.88 
 
Uber’s app is an Internet-based platform, so it does possess that distinctive sharing 
economy trait. Uber’s activities also arguably meet the wide sharing economy 
definition− the use of underutilised resources by persons other than the owner, for 
payment. Uber cars would otherwise be idle, and are providing a service to someone 
other than their legal owner. Thus, Uber can perhaps fall within the wider 
interpretation of the sharing economy.  
 
However, categorising Uber as part of the sharing economy sheds no real light on 
whether their business model is a legitimate method of avoiding regulation. The risk 
of taking the ‘sharing economy’ label at face value is subsequently forgetting to 
question what aspects of this categorisation actually present sound rationales to 
regulate. The heart of the sharing economy debate is whether Uber’s business model 
and operations are innovative in a way that allows it to legitimately avoid regulation. 
 
G Current Regulatory Responses to Innovation 
Uber presents regulators with challenges relating to how existing regulations should 
deal with innovative products and services. It has been observed that “[i]n general, 
there is a lack of tailored policy frameworks for regulating new sharing economy 
industries”.89 Many regulators are responding to innovative new businesses by simply 
imposing existing regulations. For example, in New Zealand, Uber is regulated as a 
private hire service, although it is in practice quite different to other types of private 
hire services. By simply applying existing rules to the newcomers, there is a risk of 
creating over-inclusive rules, or encouraging creative compliance on the part of the 
newly regulated actors. 
 
In the opinion of some commentators, inappropriately applying conventional industry 
standards or legislation could lead to companies attempting to exploit loopholes in the 
                                                 
88  Botsman “Defining The Sharing Economy”, above n 87. 
89  Kristina Dervojeda and others “The Sharing Economy: Accessibility-based models for peer to 
peer markets” (Case study, September 2013) at 16. 
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regulatory framework.90 This approach has been described as “a frantic game of 
‘whack-a-mole’”, where regulators struggle to contain new innovations while even 
more pop up.91 Uber is well known for criticising existing laws and regulations that 
“make innovation very difficult”, including those that are, in their opinion, 
unjustifiably extended to their operations and thus over-inclusive.92 
 
An analysis of the role of innovation within markets is useful in determining whether 
a different approach is necessary for the regulation of Uber. It will also inform an 
assessment of whether Uber can rely on its innovative business model to avoid certain 
regulations. 
 
H The Role of Innovation 
Regulators often find themselves at a crossroads when faced with an innovation such 
as Uber.93 Innovative goods and services can often better serve consumer needs by 
providing more information about those goods or services at a lower cost.94 However, 
innovations also bring risk and uncertainty to the market. In these uncertain 
conditions, regulations can play a role in balancing these competing concerns.95 The 
relationship between regulation and innovation is “full of dilemmas and paradoxes”, 
including trade-offs such as freedom versus predictability and competition versus 
regulation.96 The “fundamental paradox” is that of uncertainty versus flexibility.97 
Regulation has some ability to reduce uncertainty to tolerable levels, which may be 
necessary to create incentives for further innovation. However, innovative 
                                                 
90  Dervojeda and others, above n 89, at 16. 
91  CBC News “New forms of regulation urged for Uber and the rest of the sharing economy” (17 
February 2015) CBC News <www.cbcnews.ca>. 
92  Interview with Travis Kalanick, Uber CEO (Congressman Bob Goodlatte, 2013 State of the 
Net Luncheon Keynote, 25 January 2013). 
93  Sofia Ranchordás “Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing 
Economy” (Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Tilburg University, 
2015) at 1. 
94  Koopman and others, above n 16, at 17, drawing on Arun Sundararajan “Why the government 
doesn’t need to regulate the sharing economy” (22 October 2012) Wired <www.wired.com>. 
95  Frans van Waarden “A prototypical institution: law, regulation and innovation” in Casper 
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96  At 230. 
97  At 234. 
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developments also require some freedom and flexibility, otherwise immobility is a 
real risk.98 
 
“The plight of the modern regulator is to adapt old regulatory frameworks to new 
technologies and practices. This should not be as paralyzing as it seems.”99 Sofia 
Ranchordás explains this plight in a manner that encapsulates the balancing of 
interests that is the core challenge of achieving successful regulation:100 
 
Regulators should try to understand the challenges of innovation to 
traditional regulatory instruments and institutions− including how to marry 
the fast-changing character of innovation with the need for predictability and 
legal certainty, bridge innovation with regulatory procedure and 
requirements… and convince legislators and regulators to accommodate and 
incentivize social innovation. 
 
This is a significant challenge that requires the consideration of a number of factors, 
and is likely to depend greatly on personal perceptions on how this balance should be 
struck. A liberal perspective would believe that regulations should not hold back 
businesses, and if they do they may need to be rethought.101 Alternatively, regulators 
may instead have the predominant concerns of ensuring safety and certainty. From a 
regulator’s perspective, a relevant focus point is whether the rationales for the existing 
or proposed regulations truly apply to the activity in question; if not, the regulatory 
framework should be altered. 
 
1 Does innovation justify regulatory avoidance? 
It is first necessary to what aspects of Uber’s business model and activities are 
innovative. Uber’s app is a novel method of connecting drivers with passengers. This 
particular system of connecting suppliers and customers is common to sharing 
                                                 
98  At 230, 234. 
99  Nathan Cortez “Regulating Disruptive Innovation” (2014) 29 Berkeley Tech L J 175 at 228. 
100  Ranchordás, above n 93, at 31. 
101  Nicole Kobie “Regulation and Innovation: The case for regulating the UK’s sharing 
economy” PC Pro (London, March 2015), at 12. 
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economy companies, but is innovative in the context of taxi and private hire services. 
Uber may claim that this facilitative role means that pre-existing regulation, such as 
taxi regulation, should not apply to it because it is doing something akin to the nature 
of ‘sharing’, rather than providing a taxi service. This is the precise distinction that 
Uber will use in arguing that it should not be subject to European Union taxi 
regulations.102 
 
There is, of course, disagreement with this approach to defining Uber’s services. A 
strong counterargument is that even if Uber’s partner drivers provide the actual 
transport, the journey could not occur without Uber’s information provision and 
‘matching’ process. Thus, Uber is practically providing the same service as a taxi– 
that is, moving passengers from point A to point B– regardless of the innovative 
provision of information, or Uber’s legal disengagement from the journey itself. 
 
Consequently, the view of whether Uber is truly providing an innovative service turns 
on whether the regulator views Uber merely as the platform to match drivers and 
riders, or takes a wide view and includes the actual provision of the journey within the 
scope of Uber’s operations. It seems that, in reality, Uber’s provision of information 
and the service of a driver providing transport are not severable. Uber’s app provides 
information in an innovative way, but that information is not useful unless a journey 
is actually made. Vice versa, the journey could not occur in the same way without 
utilising Uber’s platform. So, it seems that Uber’s innovativeness should be assessed 
in light of all of its activities, rather than merely the innovativeness of the app. On this 
broad understanding of Uber’s service, perhaps Uber is not doing anything innovative 
enough to legitimately avoid regulation. 
 
On the other hand, there is a persuasive argument that Uber’s app negates the need for 
a pre-determined fare as required by private hire regulation. The app is able to 
                                                 
102  The Commercial Court of Barcelona has referred a determination of whether Uber is a 
transport service, an ‘information society’ service, or both, to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. Uber will claim it is an information society service, which would permit it to 
avoid certain national taxi laws implemented under EU directives. See Sam Schechner “Uber 
to Fight EU Rules in Europe’s Top Court” (20 July 2015) The Wall Street Journal 
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estimate a fare for the rider, and saves time and search costs by providing useful 
information immediately. As a result, the consumer may be willing to trade off the 
certainty of a fare which they have spent considerable time seeking in favour of an 
estimated fare that has saved their searching efforts. This is an example of Uber’s 
operations in fact falling within a grey area, but meets customer needs in an alternate 
manner, thereby reducing the need to enforce private hire regulations. Therefore, the 
purpose of imposing such a rule is rendered unnecessary through Uber’s innovation. 
 
I Disruptive Innovation 
An alternative approach to the role of innovations is that of disruptive innovation. 
Disruption theory refers to a situation where a new innovation undermines and 
potentially displaces existing products, firms, or industries.103 Disruptive innovations 
can disturb incumbents in many ways, such as creating unanticipated risks or benefits, 
or disturbing the equilibrium in the market.104 New customers are often enticed by the 
innovation’s more efficient or cost-effective way of providing a product or service.105 
Classic examples of disruptive innovations are the Ford Model T in the world of 
automobiles, or the personal computer in communications.106 A modern example is 
open-source publishing.107 It has even been suggested that Twitter has the potential to 
be a disruptive innovation to the way that people watch and interact with live 
sports.108  
 
The phrase ‘disruptive innovation’, much like the ‘sharing economy’, has been 
criticised for becoming overly broad; one which commentators and theorists attach to 
start-ups somewhat thoughtlessly.109 MaryAnn Gobble suggests that:110 
 
                                                 
103  Cortez, above n 99, at 175. 
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105  Ann Pegoraro “Twitter as Disruptive Innovation in Sport Communication” (2014) 2(2) C&S 
132 at 133. 
106  Cortez, above n 99, at 177. 
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Outlook 69. 
108  Pegoraro, above n 105. 
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Truthfully, creating a truly disruptive innovation is a bit like creating a viral 
video: there are attributes you have to have to have a shot at either one, but 
the final result depends on the alchemy of the market and your management 
team. 
 
If disruptiveness were based on marketing power alone, Uber would rank highly as 
being a potentially disruptive technology. However, as the quote suggests, an 
innovative technology must have certain base attributes to have disruptive potential. 
This can include the way in which the innovation presents challenges to incumbents, 
and to regulators. 
 
Disruptive innovations challenge regulators because the innovation can “fall within an 
agency’s jurisdiction but not square well with the agency’s existing regulatory 
framework”.111 As such, technologies can challenge existing frameworks and also 
trigger debate about whether the innovation is compatible with social and legal 
norms.112 Nathan Cortez suggests that some regulatory bodies suffer from inertia that 
can be “hard to break without an external shock, usually a tragedy or some other 
massive failure that reignites interest in regulation.”113 This may result in regulatory 
agencies being reluctant or slow to respond to incrementally disruptive innovations, 
and could ultimately lead to regulatory disruption.114 
 
1 Is Uber a disruptive innovation? 
It is possible to argue that Uber is in fact a form of disruptive innovation. It is 
apparent that Uber does not fit well within the existing New Zealand regulatory 
framework, since it is classified as a private hire service but is essentially competing 
in the market for taxis. Since Uber is not subject to taxi regulations, but is 
nevertheless a competitor, it is able to use its innovative business model to undercut 
taxi prices and disrupt the established industry. Uber could perhaps be described as a 
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low-end encroachment on the taxi industry; that is, one that captures price-sensitive 
customers first, before expanding to take over more of the market.115  
 
However, the question still remains whether Uber’s potential as a disruptive 
innovation is sufficient to establish a legitimate basis for regulatory avoidance. It 
seems that if Uber is cannibalising price-sensitive taxi customers without being 
subject to the same regulations, the existing rules are under-inclusive. Thus, perhaps 
the ‘fault’ of the regulatory failure lies not with Uber’s behavious, as it is complying 
with private hire regulations, but with the NZTA for failing to adjust a rule that falls 
short of capturing the intended actors. 
 
But which rules are Uber’s activities undermining the purpose of? Uber drivers, like 
taxi drivers, must comply with the P endorsement licensing requirements. Thus, there 
is no real shortcomings of these rules. Arguably it is once again the taxi regulations 
that have the purposes of safety and security, such as the requirement for vehicles to 
be fitted out with security cameras, which are the under-inclusive regulations. Uber is 
not subject to these rules since it is classified as a private hire service. This is clear 
example of Black’s indeterminacy and interpretive failure explanation for why 
regulations fail in practice.116 The taxi and private hire regulations are arguably too 
specific to have predicted an innovation such as Uber, whose operations bridge the 
two categories of small passenger services. 
 
While Uber has not grown to a stage where it has completely displaced the market for 
taxi rides in New Zealand, it has potential to boom and consequently present a greater 
threat to the incumbents, as can currently be seen in large cities such as New York 
City and London.117 Commentators have even described Uber as “crushing” and 
“annihilating” the New York City taxi industry.118 This may suggest that Uber has the 
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potential to become truly disruptive, both in the New Zealand context and perhaps 
worldwide.  
 
Uber’s innovative business model is challenging regulations that are outdated, under-
inclusive relative to their purpose, and suffering from interpretive failure. Uber is also 
challenging the operation and success of the taxi industry. This is how many 
disruptive innovations begin their lives; it is not in every instance that a disruptive 
innovation is immediately revolutionary, like the Ford Model T. Uber’s exposure of 
the flaws in the regulatory framework hints that these issues could be exacerbated as 
Uber expands their operations. 
 
It is impossible to ignore the role of innovation in Uber’s business model, and 
regulatory agencies should take it into account when deciding how to respond. 
Regulators should not be frozen when faced with an innovative newcomer such as 
Uber, but should react to adapt or change existing regulations in a way that provides 
clarity. 
 
It is difficult to see how Uber’s information provision service and the journeys 
provided by their partner drivers are separable in practice. This is an important 
consideration when determining whether existing regulations are under-inclusive, or 
whether Uber can legitimately claim their innovativeness truly affords them the 
ability to operate outside the regulations. While it is difficult to conclusively assert 
that Uber is already genuinely disruptive in the New Zealand context, overseas 
examples demonstrate that Uber has the potential to cause true chaos in the local taxi 
industries. This indicates that regulators should take steps to adjust the regulatory 
framework now, before Uber imposes even greater threats and challenges. 
 
 
VI  Welfare Economics Rationales for Regulation 
 
If we existed in a world that functioned in accordance with the perfect 
competition paradigm, there would be little need for… regulatory efforts. All 
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markets would consist of a large number of sellers of a product, and 
consumers would be fully informed of the product’s implications. Moreover, 
there would be no externalities present in this idealized economy, as all 
effects would be internalized by the buyers and sellers of a particular 
product.119 
 
As the above extract suggests, perfect competition is an ideal state that does not exist. 
Competition is generally viewed as a positive situation within a market, and various 
solutions can be utilised to attempt to bring the real world closer to the ideal. 
Occasionally regulation is the chosen mechanism to correct these problems. 
 
Many theories of regulation exist, and canvassing all of them is beyond the scope of 
this paper. A focus on the welfare economics approach to regulation, a subset of the 
public interest theory, will guide this discussion. The public interest theory was 
“bequeathed by a previous generation of economists to the present generation of 
lawyers”.120 This hints at its blended background of both legal and economic 
perspectives. According to the public interest theory regulators have a desire to pursue 
collective goals and aim to promote the general welfare of the community.121 What 
constitutes the public interest will vary according to time and place, and also 
according to the values held by the particular society.122 Therefore, the public interest 
is not static, which implies that the goals of the associated regulation will also have an 
element of fluidity. 
 
Public interest rationales of regulation can be divided into economic and political 
approaches. Normative economic theories principally rely on the concepts of 
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economic efficiency and market failure.123 Efficiency can be described as a situation 
when:124 
 
… resources, goods and services are allocated to their highest expected 
valued uses as measured by individual willingness to pay, assuming that the 
most productive existing technology is used. 
 
A market that is not efficient can also be described as creating a situation of market 
failure.125 According to the public interest theory, regulation is justified if it corrects 
these perceived deficiencies in the market.126 Therefore, correcting these market 
failures and improving market efficiency may be an underlying purpose of imposing 
regulation. Market failure may also indicate that the existing regulation is not fit for 
purpose, perhaps because it is either under- or over-inclusive. 
 
Market failure is a necessary but not sufficient economic justification for 
intervention.127 Anthony Ogus’ view is that market failure must also be accompanied 
by private law failure before there is a prima facie case for regulatory intervention.128 
He also cautions that regulatory intervention is not a flawless solution, since it is not 
guaranteed to reduce inefficiencies, and there is also a risk that any efficiency gains 
may be outweighed by increased transaction costs.129 Consequently, it should be 
remembered that regulation is not the ultimate answer to market failure. 
 
Markets can fail for four main reasons. These include imbalances of market power, 
the presence of externalities, the nature of public goods, and the effects of imperfect 
information. The most relevant potential market failures in relation to Uber’s situation 
are market power imbalances and imperfect information. These will be discussed in 
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the context of Uber and the New Zealand taxi market, in order to identify whether 
there are any indications of market failure, and whether Uber mitigates or reinforces 
any existing market imperfections. 
 
J Market Power 
An imbalance of market power can cause market failure due to the large market 
players inhibiting competition. When competition is restricted, prices tend to rise and 
the quantity that is supplied is normally lower than is socially desirable. This situation 
is typified by the existence of a monopoly in the market.130 Monopolies create market 
failure since they result in a higher price and lesser quantity of their good or service 
than a perfectly competitive market would provide. In such a situation, demand and 
supply are not at a socially desirable equilibrium.131 Monopolies can also lead to 
reduced innovation, lower product service and quality, and excessive production 
costs.132 
 
1 The existing taxi industry 
Worldwide, taxis are traditionally a heavily regulated industry. Local taxi industries 
are often regulated, to varying degrees, to the extent that the situation created through 
regulation is akin to a monopoly. For example, New York City yellow cabs, which 
operate based on a medallion system, essentially operate as a monopoly in the City 
district. The number of medallions is currently just over 13,000.133  As a result, 
participation in the industry is limited to those who can obtain one of a limited 
number of medallions through an auction run by the New York City Taxi and 
Limousine Commission.134 This restricts the level of supply, and consequently taxi 
prices are higher than if the market was unregulated. Thus, taking New York as an 
only one example, taxi industries are commonly seen as acting in a monopolistic 
manner, regardless of whether the industry is technically a monopoly or not. 
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The New Zealand taxi market structure is somewhat different, since taxis are not 
regulated in terms of prices and quantities. Theoretically, the taxi industry should be 
operating in a competitive manner, based on taxi organisations’ ability to set prices at 
“whatever level they think the market will take”.135 However, there appears to be 
social consensus that fares have not fallen as much as they should have, or were 
expected to, since the industry was deregulated.136 This sentiment is perhaps 
evidenced by New Zealand’s relatively high cost of taxi journeys.137 There is also 
evidence of an oversupply within the industry, especially in large cities such as 
Auckland.138 These two factors juxtapose uneasily, and indicate that the ‘deregulated’ 
New Zealand market is not functioning in a way that traditional market theory would 
expect. 
 
It is unclear exactly what forces have caused this unusual situation. One potentially 
socially unpalatable solution is that the market for taxis has reached its natural 
equilibrium in regard to price and quantity, which unfortunately is at a higher price 
than what consumers would prefer. As stated in the above discussion of the New 
Zealand taxi industry, a full economic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, it is clear that the New Zealand taxi industry is somewhat unconventional– 
and the increased competition from Uber has possibly muddied the waters further. 
 
2 Uber’s position within the taxi market 
 
Ridesharing is here to stay, technologically. The only open question is 
whether regulators (and prosecutors) will allow competition from the legacy 
taxi industry. If every car service were permitted to set whatever price they 
want, those cab drivers in Paris and New York would have no reason to 
protest and lots of financial reasons to laud the differentiation advantages 
(experience, safety, availability, etc.) their service offers in competition with 
Uber. But as Forbes commented, whether the sharing economy can survive 
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in a regulatory world where its basic innovation paradigm of connecting 
people who want to engage in private, consensual transactions is treated 
legally as something completely different is the much harder, and more 
economically important, question.139 
 
The above quotation emphasises how a heavily regulated traditional taxi industry is 
potentially at a disadvantage in relation to newcomers such as Uber. It also identifies 
one of the main question facing regulators in this situation. Is Uber to be treated as a 
direct competitor and thus a substitute within the existing taxi industry, or is it to be 
treated as “something completely different”? 
 
This question has been discussed in light of both the sharing economy and innovation 
rationales for regulatory intervention. It has been suggested that Uber is essentially 
providing the same service as a taxi, despite some aspects of their business being 
innovative, and that legally Uber’s liability is limited to the work of its app. This 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Uber is often referred to as a competitor to 
taxis. 
 
Uber CEO Travis Kalanick consistently laments the existence of regulations that 
“might have originally been designed to protect passengers or drivers, but decades 
later exist to preserve a century-old monopoly for a connected view.”140 He has also 
pinned blame on regulatory bodies, stating that laws can create roadblocks for new 
technologies.141 In the New Zealand context, Ian Apperley has described the taxi 
industry’s response to Uber as “choos[ing] to try and kill the new player in the market 
to retain their profit.”142 These comments emphasise Uber’s direct competition with 
the taxi industry, and imply that the practical response is to view them as being 
competitors. Accordingly, this discussion will continue based on the assessment Uber 
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drivers are essentially providing the same services as a taxi driver, and should be 
considered as competitors within the market for taxi services. 
 
3 Regulatory responses to Uber’s entry into the taxi market 
The quantifiable impact of Uber on the taxi industry is unclear, as there is a lack of 
data to inform how the market has altered due to Uber’s growth. The respective 
numbers of new Uber drivers, taxi drivers switching to become Uber drivers, and taxi 
drivers dropping out of the market altogether would be informative in evaluating the 
new market forces. According to traditional theory, the market price should decrease 
as Uber expands, since in most instances Uber prices are lower than taxis.143 This is 
desirable for consumers who are now, on average, paying less for essentially the same 
service. However, the effect on the quantity of supplied journeys is unclear.  
 
The lack of data creates uncertainty about how, or even whether, regulators should 
respond. Further, existing regulation is not aimed at controlling the market price and 
quantity. Deregulation of the industry was intended to allow the number of taxis and 
fares to become flexible. Imposing regulations on taxi drivers was the compromise, 
and these regulations are intended to ensure the quality of taxi drivers and their 
vehicles, rather than the price of taxis. Focusing on safety precautions, such as 
background checks and minimum vehicle standards, intentionally leaves the issue of 
prices and quantities outside the regulatory scope. As a result, these existing 
regulations do not get at the reasons behind the existing market failure. This suggests 
that additional regulation relating to price and or quantity may be desirable, in order 
to correct the market failure based on excess supply. Conversely, regulators may wish 
to take a ‘wait and see’ approach to how Uber influences the price and quantity in the 
market over time, before reintroducing price and quantity controls. 
 
As noted above, Black suggests that flawed rules are likely to be exposed during 
times of rapid change and where the course of change is unforeseeable.144 This 
description could be applied to the taxi industry as Uber expands its operations. While 
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regulators may ideally wish for the market to become more stable before imposing 
any new rules, the uncertainty of the current system has exacerbated a potentially 
flawed regulatory regime. The SPSR has acknowledged this, however since the report 
is focussing only on licensing requirements, it may not have addressed this question at 
all.  
 
In conclusion, there is no conclusive rationale for regulatory intervention for the 
purposes of correcting a market failure. The existing regulations have different 
purposes entirely, and regulators would have to return to old price and quantity 
controls to begin to address this flaw in the market. The impact of Uber does not point 
the argument in either direction; rather, it further muddies the waters in what is an 
unusual and complex market. However, one thing seems clear–Uber is operating in 
competition with taxis. 
 
K Information Asymmetry 
A situation of information asymmetry indicates that one party has more information 
than the other. This causes the market to operate inefficiently, and can result in 
market failure. In relation to information symmetry producing an efficient market, 
Ogus states that:145 
 
The assertion that observed market behaviour in the form of expressed 
preferences leads to allocative efficiency depends crucially on two 
fundamental assumptions: that decision-makers have adequate information 
on the set of alternatives available, including the consequences to them of 
exercising choice in different ways; and that they are capable of processing 
that information and of ‘rationally’ behaving in a way that maximises their 
expected utility. A significant failure of either assumption may set up a prima 
facie case for regulatory intervention. 
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These assumptions never hold completely true since perfect information never 
exists.146 Consequently, an absence of perfect information alone cannot justify 
regulatory intervention.147 It is widely accepted that ‘bounded rationality’ applies in 
such situations; referring to humans’ limited ability to receive, store and process 
information.148 The more relevant policy question, Ogus suggests, is whether the 
unregulated market generates ‘optimal’ information. An optimal quantity of 
information exists where the marginal costs of generating the information equals the 
marginal benefit of supplying that information.149 Optimal information should allow a 
consumer to make an informed decision, subject to their bounded rationality.150 
 
Schwartz and Wilde advocate that this traditional approach is not sufficient to 
determine whether intervention is justified. A question of optimal information 
requires a generalisation about how informed the consumers are in a given market, 
and also focuses on individuals rather than on markets, which leads to unhelpful 
assumptions. Instead, they suggest the inquiry should be whether competition 
amongst firms for particular groups of consumers who search for information is 
sufficient to generate optimal prices and terms for all consumers, including searching 
and non-searching customers. Accordingly, the focus is on whether the market is 
behaving competitively, rather than the level of information customers have. 
Schwartz and Wilde suggest that the questions that should concern regulatory 
decision-makers can essentially be boiled down to whether markets are, or can be 
made, competitive.151 
 
1 Uber effectively reduces information asymmetries 
The Internet has allowed for a more efficient allocation of resources and facilitation of 
commerce. In particular, sharing economy structures have great potential to decrease 
information asymmetry due to the Internet’s ability to lower information barriers and 
also to facilitate feedback. Sharing economies also encourages market participants to 
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establish trust, which enhances reputational mechanisms.152 Aspects of these benefits 
can be seen when assessing Uber’s role in overcoming information asymmetry issues 
within the taxi industry. 
 
In many jurisdictions taxis are regulated in an attempt to protect consumers from 
information asymmetry.153 Arguably this is true in New Zealand, and is reflected in 
the requirements that taxi drivers must display their prices and driver identification. 
However, it is suggested by some commentators that the New Zealand taxi industry is 
still too geared towards supplier interests.154 For example, even though taxis are 
required to display prices, the information is too complicated for a consumer to 
process when they are in a hurry to get somewhere. The information asymmetry is in 
favour of the taxi organisation, which benefits from making it difficult for consumers 
to ascertain all relevant information before making a choice. So, while the purpose of 
the rule that taxis must display prices and driver information is intended to aid the 
consumer in making an informed decision, in practice the existing regulation does not 
successfully meet its purpose. 
 
Some commentators argue that regulations which are justified by claiming that 
consumers lack adequate information are mitigated “by the Internet’s powerful and 
unprecedented ability to provide timely and pointed consumer information”.155 Uber 
and its Internet-based information platform support this proposition by providing 
relatively more up-front information. Once a passenger enters their pickup and drop-
off locations in the app, Uber provides information about the closest available driver, 
such as the driver’s name and photograph, their license plate number, and their rating. 
This information is provided before the offer of the ride is accepted, so a passenger 
has the opportunity to assess the information before making a decision. Uber’s five-
star rating system also provides an assessment of the quality of the driver; and 
conversely, the driver can see the rating of the passenger. Passengers are also warned 
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when fare rates will be higher than normal due to high levels of demand. 
Consequently, a potential passenger is able to access relevant information 
immediately and can use this to make an informed decision about whether or not they 
will choose to ride with Uber.  
 
Since the app removes information barriers that otherwise exist in the taxi market, 
there is no rationale for Uber to be subject to regulations regarding price and driver 
information display. As a result, the existing rule relating to taxis displaying prices 
successfully encapsulates its purpose, and should not be extended to cover Uber. Uber 
could also legitimately argue that they are complying private hire service regulation 
that requires driver details to be displayed, since they are provided by the app. 
 
Even if Uber diminishes information asymmetries in the market for taxis, they are 
possibly failing to meet the regulation that does in fact apply to them– the 
requirement that private hire services must pre-arrange a fare for the journey. As 
discussed above in the taxi and Uber operations section of this paper, the rationale for 
this rule is somewhat unclear, but the fact that Uber is in practice competing with 
taxis may mean that the setting of a fare in advance, which is intended to create 
certainty for a rider, has an over-reaching purpose in this context. 
 
Based on Schwartz and Wilde’s view, if it is accepted that Uber is improving the level 
of competition in the market, there is no need to alter existing regulations in relation 
to Uber. Uber is creating competition by encouraging greater information disclosure. 
If any recommendation were to be made, Schwartz and Wilde would probably 
conclude that taxis should be required to disclose information in an even clearer 
manner, in order to increase the competition for information-seeking consumers. 
 
2 Feedback systems and the importance of reputation 
Feedback systems give customers “a more powerful voice in economic 
transactions”,156 and create reputational incentives for providers to offer a positive 
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experience in return for good feedback.157 The Internet has facilitated the ability for 
feedback to influence reputation, and consequently regulate the market by creating 
higher demand for providers with a positive reputation. Conversely, potential 
customers are clearly disincentivised from exchanging with traders with poor 
feedback. Therefore, success and a positive reputation directly affect a provider’s 
ability to participate in the market.158 
 
Uber’s post-ride feedback tool is an apt example of this mechanism. Uber is able to 
somewhat mitigate market failure by requiring the provision of information that is 
immediately relevant to the customer. Therefore, the passenger can independently 
verify whether the best route was taken, and can place negative feedback if not.159 
The passenger also has the information they require to take action should they be less 
than satisfied with their experience. Drivers have the same ability to report unruly or 
unsafe passengers. This relationship drives trust within the sharing economy, and 
arguably removes some need for regulations that address issues of information 
asymmetry. The Internet’s ability to remove some of these information barriers has 
created a “fundamental shift in the balance of power between consumers and 
salesmen over the last generation and it points in the direction of consumers.”160 
 
However, there will always be some level of information barrier between driver and 
passenger, regardless of whether the customer chooses to use a taxi or an Uber. For 
example, customers are required to take Uber at their word that adequate safety 
checks have been conducted on the driver prior to the journey. In New Zealand, the 
requirements of Uber drivers are relatively stringent, as is noted above. Perhaps, 
therefore, this issue is not as significant as in other countries where drivers do not 
have such high requirements of competence. 
 
Since feedback systems are based on trust between the users of the platform, they can 
be open to abuse and manipulation by the users; for example, passengers giving 
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drivers unfairly poor feedback. Such actions may “bring imperfections into the 
feedback and trust-building mechanisms that constitute the very backbone of the 
shared economy”.161 Simply relying on the goodwill of Uber users and drivers to 
provide honest feedback is a somewhat weak-response to this critique, but it reflects 
the trust-based nature of the sharing economy. It is in each participant’s best interests 
to be honest about their experience with Uber, in order to build a network of 
relationships and strengthen the peer-to-peer aspect of this corner of the sharing 
economy. 
 
L Evaluation of the Welfare Economics Model 
The welfare economics theory of public interest rationales for regulation only 
encapsulates a rather narrow approach to evaluating the justifications of regulatory 
intervention. In order to have a more balanced analysis, it would be desirable to also 
consider distributional factors. However, a comprehensive public interest theory 
analysis, including a political public interest approach to regulation, is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
VII Uber’s Operations in Other Countries 
 
A comparative analysis of taxi industries and Uber’s experiences in different 
jurisdictions is a useful exercise as it highlights some of the challenges that Uber 
presents to regulatory bodies. The examples which this paper will focus on are 
England and California. First, England’s analysis of Uber in the context of the 
distinction between taxi and private hire services is informative for the same 
distinction under New Zealand law. Secondly, Californian regulatory agencies are 
addressing a question that has not yet significantly troubled New Zealand regulators, 
but sheds light on how Uber’s grey-area operations within the field of employment 
are being characterised. 
 
The questions and conclusions that arise from these discussions and comparisons may 
influence recommendations for regulatory reform in New Zealand, and potentially 
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foreshadow challenges that New Zealand regulators may face in the future. A 
discussion of the regulatory responses is also relevant to the discussion of whether 
Uber is considered to be legitimately avoiding regulation, or, alternatively, whether 
the existing rules appear to be over- or under- inclusive.  
 
A England 
1 Law Commission report on taxi and private hire services 
The Law Commission for England and Wales recently undertook a review of taxi and 
private hire services, which culminated in an advisory report in May 2014. The report 
ultimately recommended retaining the current two-tier regulatory system which 
distinguishes between taxis and private hire services, as well as recommending the 
repeal of most of the existing legislation and the implementation of broad national 
standards for all taxis and private hire vehicles.  
 
The setting of independent taxi and private hire service standards by local authorities 
meant that there was a lack of consistency, and, in the Commission’s opinion, meant 
that the law was unduly restrictive and contained confusing overlaps.162 The report 
advocates the application of broadly similar standards to drivers, vehicles and 
dispatchers, to the extent that regulation would meet the defined purposes of public 
safety, accessibility, enforcement of the legislation and environmental protection.163  
 
The Commission began by looking at the ‘common regulated activity’, which was 
defined as “the carriage of passengers in a vehicle provided for hire together with the 
services of a driver”.164 To the extent of this common activity, they considered that a 
common national framework of standards for both taxis and private hire vehicles 
would remove these problems.165 The Commission stated that regulation should aim 
at ensuring that the vehicle and driver are both of a high standard, and that the quality 
and safety of the journey is upheld regardless of what form the transport takes.166  
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Thus far, it seems that the Commission’s approach accepts that the rationale for 
regulation extends to both taxis and private hire services. However, it was ultimately 
recommended that the two-tier framework be retained. This decision was partly 
justified on the basis that customers seeking to hire a private hire vehicle have a 
greater opportunity to shop around and compare factors such as price, reliability and 
availability,167 while taxi customers tend to take the first taxi that comes along.168 
Consequently, taxi customers should have greater protections, since they have lesser 
ability to assess these factors in advance.169 
 
A stakeholder consultation process affirmed this distinction as being legitimate. The 
current higher standards imposed on taxis were considered justifiable since taxis 
service “more immediate needs”, and high and consistent standards need to be 
ensured.170 In contrast, private hire customers have more choice when planning a 
journey, and thus do not need such stringent protections.171 
 
The feedback on the administrative impacts of adopting a single regulatory 
framework was mixed. For example, Transport for London (“TfL”) was concerned 
that a one-tier system would impose unnecessarily high standards on private hire 
drivers, and could create a black market for unlicensed drivers.172 In contrast, 
licensing authorities were largely in favour of moving to a one-tier system,173 in 
particular because enforcement would be substantially easier and regulatory loopholes 
would be reduced.174 
 
The report highlights how new technologies such as Uber are blurring the distinction 
between taxis and private hire vehicles.175 The Commission acknowledged that as 
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new technologies grow, “the interchangeability of taxi and private hire services… 
increases, placing a strain on the different modes of regulation applicable to each”.176 
They also conceded that:177 
 
… it is hard to dispute the claim that, in general, the public neither knows nor 
cares about the distinction [between taxi and private hire services], and 
indeed even those who work in the industry may well refer to a private hire 
vehicle as a taxi for the sake of ease. This ties in with the fact that both types 
of service may be said to do the same task, of transporting passengers for a 
fee. 
 
This seems to acknowledge that taxi and private hire service providers are practically 
operating within the same market; they are providing the same service and can be 
referred to interchangeably. The Commission then went on to state:178 
 
That said, it is perhaps superficial to suggest that lack of consumer 
understanding necessitates a change in the law– after all, members of the 
public often find themselves affected by regulatory regimes they do not 
understand, but which may nevertheless benefit them. 
 
The Commission placed great emphasis on taxi fare regulation by local authorities as 
a justification for retaining the two-tier framework. They affirmed that imposing fare 
regulation on pre-booked journeys would undermine the distinction between private 
hire and taxi services.179 Therefore, the distinction that should be drawn between taxis 
and private hire should be focussed on the issues of dispatch and pre-booking.180 This 
implies that the decision to retain the distinction is not predominantly related to the 
purpose of safety, although the Commission did agree with TfL’s argument about 
imposing unnecessarily high standards on private hire drivers.181 
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2 Analysis of the Law Commission’s approach 
The Commission’s recommendation to retain a two-tier system, and the reasons they 
give for doing so, are relevant when considering the current regulatory approach to 
this situation in New Zealand. The Commission admits that new technologies such as 
Uber are making the division between taxi and private hire services somewhat 
unclear, and is reinforced by the fact that customers often barely register the 
distinction between the two services. This is an interesting concession to the practical 
view of the market; that Uber is most probably a competitor in the taxi industry, even 
if it is regulated by another name. 
 
When considering the purposes of the regulation in the context of the common 
activity of a driver carrying passengers in a for-hire vehicle, the Commission states 
that broadly similar regulations should apply. This seems to acknowledge the 
conclusion that was reached above in this paper– the purposes of quality and safety 
assurance should apply equally to both modes of transport. 
 
However, England’s existing lighter-handed approach to private hire services appears 
to largely be based on the claim that pre-booking affords customers time to search for 
information and subsequently to make an informed decision. In contrast, taxi services 
are more immediate, and do not allow information to be gathered to any significant 
extent. Therefore, more stringent standards on taxis are justifiable because they 
protect customers who have no opportunity to gather information. 
 
It is possible to contend that Uber is actually bridging these two situations, and 
therefore the purpose of the regulation does not apply to it. This suggestion was made 
in the above discussion of the New Zealand taxi market. Uber provides upfront 
information to a potential passenger, thereby allowing them to make an informed 
decision, similar to what would occur when hiring a private hire vehicle. However, in 
practice Uber’s service is perhaps more akin to an ‘on-demand’ journey, like a taxi, 
rather than one that is arranged well in advance like other private hire vehicles, such 
as wedding cars or limousines. Thus, the rationale for the distinction arguably does 
not apply in this case.  In this way, Uber could argue that it should be entitled to avoid 
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regulation, since the purposes of the private hire regulations do not apply to its 
activities.  
 
This distinction is perhaps even less persuasive in the New Zealand context, since the 
requirements for New Zealander taxi drivers and Uber drivers are more similar than 
the vastly different standards in London. For example, New Zealand taxi drivers do 
not have such burdensome requirements such as learning ‘the Knowledge’, or a city 
map by heart.182 The fees for becoming a licensed taxi driver are also much greater in 
London.183 As a result, the argument that a common standard would place 
unjustifiably high burdens on private hire drivers does not carry the same weight for a 
discussion related to New Zealand. 
 
The Law Commission’s report may influence New Zealand regulators to consider 
Uber within the same market as taxi services, particularly since the different standards 
between the two services is not as explicit in a New Zealand context. However, the 
rationale for information barriers and pre-booking do still apply in a New Zealand 
context, but on a practical view Uber seems to overcome this issue. This may be 
persuasive to New Zealand regulators when making decisions about how to regulate 
Uber in New Zealand. 
 
B California 
1 Labour Commissioner’s ruling on employee status 
Uber is also facing multiple regulatory challenges in California. Notably, the 
California Labour Commissioner’s Office has recently ruled that a specific Uber 
driver should have been classified as an employee rather than an independent 
contractor.184 This has been perceived as a potentially troublesome hurdle for Uber to 
overcome in the future, especially if this ruling is upheld upon appeal. 
                                                 
182  “Apply for a taxi driver licence” Transport for London <https://tfl.gov.uk>. 
183  A Small Passenger Service Vehicle licence costs $161.70 for one year, assuming that the 
applicant has passed the P endorsement course: See “P endorsement for carrying passengers”, 
above n 46, while a London taxi driver licence costs upwards of £936: See Transport for 
London, above n 182 (as at 28 September 2015). 
184  Barbara Ann Berwick v Uber Technologies California Labour Commissioner (11-46739 EK, 
10 March 2015). 
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In order to determine whether the driver, Barbara Ann Berwick, was an employee or a 
contractor, the Commissioner assessed the level of control that Uber had over her. In 
Yellow Cab Cooperative,185 which involved very similar circumstances, the 
overriding factor in finding an employment relationship was that the workers were not 
engaged in a distinct business from the employer. The Commissioner summarised that 
an employment relationship will be found if:186 
 
… pervasive control over the operation as a whole is retained, the workers’ 
duties are an integral part of the operation, and the nature of the work makes 
detailed control unnecessary. 
 
Further, the Borello case stated there is an inference of employment if personal 
services are performed, as opposed to business services. It is not necessary for an 
employer to maintain complete control over the employee; the minimum necessary 
control is the standard.187 
 
In the Berwick hearing the Commissioner stated that there is a presumption of 
employment in this situation, and the party seeking to avoid liability must prove 
otherwise. “By obtaining the clients in need of the service and providing the workers 
to conduct it, Defendants retained all necessary control over the operation as a 
whole”.188 Although Uber claimed that their involvement is limited to being a 
technological platform, this was rejected; “The reality, however, is that Defendants 
are involved in every aspect of the operation.”189 
 
                                                 
185  Yellow Cab Cooperative v Workers Compensation Appeals Board 226 F 3d 1288 (9th Cir 
1991). 
186  Berwick v Uber, above n 184, at 7, referring to Yellow Cab Cooperative. 
187  S G Borello & Sons, Inc v Department of Industrial Relations 48 F 3d 341 (9th Cir 1989) at 
355-360. 
188  Berwick v Uber, above n 184, at 8. 
189  At 9. 
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Although the media has highlighted this as being a significant decision for Uber, the 
ruling does not apply beyond Berwick.190 In other jurisdictions Uber has successfully 
defended the claim that their drivers are independent contractors. However, it has the 
potential to result in a flood of claims in California, and may encourage claims in 
other states.191 Since the Berwick hearing, there has been a similar successful claim in 
the California Employment Development Department.192 
 
The consequences for Uber are potentially wide reaching if further claims are 
successfully pursued, both in the United States of America and also worldwide. If all 
Uber drivers in the United States are indeed employees, Uber’s United States costs 
alone would explode due to the sudden imposition of social security workers’ 
compensation and unemployment insurance.193 Such a finding would also impose 
further employment regulations regarding insurance, indemnification, holiday pay, 
and many other expenses, which would be extremely costly to Uber, particularly for 
employees who only work a few hours a week.194 So far, Uber has essentially shirked 
these costs by placing the burden for such protections on the drivers; a move some 
commentators perceive as the corporation abusing an unfair advantage.195 With the 
aid of slick marketing Uber promotes this as a positive feature of being an Uber 
driver. The flexibility and self-control of working hours, and the attractiveness of 
providing the opportunity to earn income from multiple sources, has in part been 
responsible for the speed of Uber’s growth.196 
 
The central question facing Uber in California is how much control they have over 
their ‘employees’. If Uber’s ability to deregister drivers, set fare rates and enforce 
certain protocols amounts to sufficient control to establish an employee-employer 
                                                 
190  Mike Isaac and Natasha Singer “California Says Uber Driver is Employee, Not a Contractor” 
The New York Times (online ed, New York, 17 June 2015). 
191  Isaac and Singer, above n 190. 
192  Heather Somerville “Uber driver was an employee, rules California department” (10 
September 2015) Reuters <www.reuters.com>. 
193  Chris Johnston “Uber drivers are employees not contractors, California rules” (17 June 2015) 
The Guardian <www.theguardian.com>. 
194  Gil Silberman “The California Ruling On Uber Drivers Would Be Disastrous − But It’s 
Probably An Aberration” (30 June 2015) Forbes <www.forbes.com>. 
195   Katy Steinmetz “Why the California Ruling on Uber Should Frighten the Sharing Economy” 
(17 June 2015) TIME <http://time.com>. 
196  Steinmetz, above n 195. 
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relationship for a wider category than one individual in California alone, this will 
radically alter Uber’s business model. As stated, the Commissioner’s decision was 
binding only on the individual in the hearing. Uber has appealed that decision to the 
San Francisco Superior Court,197 which may be a risky move, considering that an 
unsuccessful appeal within the court system could create a binding precedent.198 
 
2 Analysis of the Labour Commissioner’s ruling 
The distinction between employees and independent contractors is significant for 
Uber in all of its markets, not just in California. When someone is defined as an 
employee, this categorisation “acts as a gateway to a wide range of… legal rights, 
obligations and protections”.199 In contrast, independent contractors are “seen as 
autonomous, arranging their own remuneration, holidays, and other conditions”.200 
Whilst a comprehensive discussion of the employment status of Uber drivers is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is yet another regulatory issue that has many 
regulators pausing for thought. 
 
Uber would argue that they are able to avoid the requirements and responsibilities of 
employment, both due to the legal categorisation of Uber drivers and also from a 
practical perspective. Uber’s flexible business model allows a driver to work as much 
or as little as they like, whenever they like, and there are no requirements surrounding 
part-time or full time employment, or minimum or maximum work hours. This type 
of arrangement, Uber would contend, falls under an independent contractor regime, 
rather than one of employment. If this categorisation is legitimate, perhaps Uber’s 
innovation consequently allows them to legitimately avoid regulation.  
 
This analysis is also, of course, dependent on the jurisdiction in question and the 
relevant employment regulations. In California Uber’s business model was not 
accepted as legitimate avoidance of employment laws. On this view, it could be said 
                                                 
197  Ellen Huet “Uber Driver Is An Employee, Not Contractor, Rules California Labor 
Commission” (27 June 2015) Forbes <www.forbes.com>. 
198  Steinmetz, above n 195. 
199  Gordon Anderson “Employment Law in New Zealand” (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) at 95. 
200  At 104. 
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that Uber is deliberately constructing their employment agreements to contract out of 
employer responsibilities, which is arguably illegitimate regulatory avoidance. Many 
sceptics of Uber’s business model would agree that Uber is deliberately evading their 
obligations.  
 
This issue has not been significantly debated in New Zealand. It is unlikely that the 
SPSR will address this issue, since it is focused on licensing requirements, rather than 
the relationships between Uber and Uber drivers. However, the issue may arise in the 
future as Uber’s operations grow within New Zealand, and more people are 
employed, or independently contracted as, Uber drivers. 
 
 
VIII Conclusion 
 
It is clear to see why Uber it often described as blurring the regulatory line. Uber 
presents regulators with both opportunities and challenges. Its ruthless approach to 
entering new markets has regulatory bodies scrambling to determine what, if any, 
actions should be taken in response. Uber is growing by the day, and is entering new 
countries and cities extremely rapidly. Consequently, it is also likely to face 
heightened and various challenges from both disgruntled competitors and regulators. 
 
The New Zealand situation is different to many other taxi industries worldwide, since 
existing regulations largely focus on the quality of the taxi drivers rather than 
imposing price and quantity controls on taxi services. The rationale behind these 
regulations is to ensure the quality of taxi drivers, and correspondingly, the safety of 
both passengers and drivers. So, even if Uber’s avoidance of these regulations is 
legitimate as a result of an under-inclusive rule, it is undesirable based on the purpose 
of the regulations. However, the licensing requirements of Uber drivers are very 
similar to those of taxi drivers, so to this extent the rules capture both Uber drivers 
and taxi drivers to a similar degree.  
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While there is debate as to whether Uber can be truly categorised as a sharing 
economy company, there are aspects of Uber’s operational model that draw on 
characteristics of sharing economy businesses. As an Internet platform, Uber has 
changed the way in which passengers can request and make a journey by car. Uber 
arguably also displays features of disruptive innovation, and as Uber grows within 
New Zealand and worldwide, these qualities are likely to become exacerbated. Thus, 
regulators should not shy away from dealing with Uber, as it appears it is here to stay. 
 
As an innovative platform, Uber confronts regulators with multiple difficult trade-
offs. Innovations can mitigate the need for certain types of regulation, but can also 
create a need to balance a minimum level of certainty while also allowing for 
flexibility in order to drive further innovation. Although Uber can be legitimately 
characterised as an innovative business, it seems that the purposes of several existing 
regulations, particularly those relating to safety, still apply to the service it provides. 
Therefore, an innovation theory analysis suggests that these rules are under-inclusive 
relative to their purpose, and should be extended to cover the new, innovative Uber 
model. 
 
The traditional regulatory intervention theory of welfare economics provides a 
conventional framework for assessing whether regulatory intervention in the market 
would be justified. Uber is essentially competing in the same market as taxis. In many 
jurisdictions, including New Zealand, it is possible to construe the existing taxi 
industry as effectively a form of monopolistic competition, and Uber is providing an 
increased level of competition within that industry. However, any regulatory change 
would need to address price and quantity restrictions, rather than adjusting the 
existing quality-focussed regulations. 
 
Uber’s utilisation of an Internet-based platform means that Uber is able to provide 
both passengers and drivers with greater levels of information than what currently 
exists in the taxi market. Uber’s app successfully lowers information asymmetry 
barriers, meaning that regulation aimed at this form of market failure is less 
justifiable. Consequently, Uber’s approach to information provision negates to a large 
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extent the justification for regulatory intervention based on claims of imperfect 
information. 
 
London and California’s approaches towards the problems they are facing with Uber 
demonstrate the diversity of issues that Uber presents. While neither of these 
jurisdictions yet has a comprehensive regulatory framework for the many challenges 
which Uber presents, their various tactics may aid New Zealand regulators in 
identifying future issues and also in deciding how to approach these aspects of Uber’s 
business models to the extent that they also exist in New Zealand. In particular, there 
is a comparison to be made between the outcomes of the SPSR, once they are made 
public, and the approach that other jurisdictions take in regard to licensing 
requirements.  
 
The overarching question of regulatory avoidance has aided the framing Uber’s 
business model, but Uber’s activities cannot be wholly characterised as legitimate or 
illegitimate regulatory avoidance. In relation to some aspects of its activities, Uber’s 
innovative approach to providing passengers with a driver and a car appears to be a 
legitimate method of avoiding existing regulations that apply to taxi or private hire 
services. From another perspective, if it is accepted that Uber is essentially operating 
in the taxi market, it seems that Uber may be avoiding regulations that should ideally 
apply to them. Uber has legally distanced itself from several regulations; thus, the 
avoidance is legitimate. Whether this is socially desirable, however, is another 
question altogether. 
 
Regulators should be urged to reconsider the under-inclusiveness of several existing 
regulations since their purposes, particularly those relating to safety, apply to both 
taxis and Uber. There is a clear rationale for regulating Uber when taking a practical 
view of the service that Uber provides, and the corresponding safety considerations 
that should be upheld. Whether people choose to use Uber or taxis, they want to get to 
their destination safely. Surely this consideration is sufficient to persuade regulators 
that they must reassess how the existing regulatory framework could better achieve 
these goals. 
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